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Special Issue Articles
Foreword: International Tax Policy in a 
Disruptive Environment
In this foreword to International Tax Policy in 
a Disruptive Environment: A Special Issue, the 
authors provide an overview of the two-day 
interdisciplinary conference that took place in 
Munich on 14-15 December 2017, and offer a 
synopsis of the articles in this special edition of 
the Bulletin for International Taxation.
1.  Introduction
In December 2017, the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law 
and Public Finance hosted in Munich a two-day inter-
disciplinary conference on International Tax Policy in a 
Disruptive Environment.1 The conference objective was 
to explore the topology of the post-BEPS international 
tax world and how international tax coordination would 
intersect with international tax competition in the after-
math of BEPS. 
2.  Overview of the Conference
The conference examined two broad topic areas. The 
first was the state of international taxation following the 
completion of the BEPS Action Reports and the subse-
quent implementation of the BEPS Action Plan by the 
G20, OECD and the Inclusive Framework member states. 
Conference presentations explored topics including BEPS 
and the single tax principle, theoretical and institutional 
aspects of international tax coordination through the 
G20/OECD Inclusive Framework, finding meaning in 
and implementing the concept of “taxing value where it 
is created”, Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR), the 
Multilateral Instrument (MLI), and pressures on dispute 
resolution in the new tax environment. 
The second grouping of topics considered important 
international tax challenges left unaddressed by or unfin-
ished in the BEPS Project for developed and developing 
countries. The most significant developed country issue 
relates to the global shift away from residence taxation 
and the resulting pressure to implement more effective 
source or destination-based income taxation. Presen-
tations considered structural and political reasons why 
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the destination-based cash f low tax (DBCFT) proposed 
in the United States failed to move forward, alternative 
sales-based apportionment of profits, and issues in taxing 
digital commerce. Whether taxing income earned in the 
digital economy is a subset of addressing source-based 
taxation or is a separate issue is sometimes unclear, but 
taxing digital commerce is no doubt currently the most 
politically pressing issue in the international tax system. 
Developing countries’ taxing needs were largely unad-
dressed in BEPS and left for follow-on work through the 
Inclusive Framework and “toolkits” to be developed by the 
Platform for Collaboration on Tax. Conference presenta-
tions included examining distributional objectives across 
countries (redistribution from rich to poor countries or 
from rich to poor people) and the role of taxation, the taxa-
tion of local rents, directly and when realized through off-
shore liquidity events representing indirect sales of assets 
(offshore asset sales), and transfer pricing challenges for 
developing countries.
The conference was held at an opportune time, follow-
ing as it did important post-BEPS developments, such 
as the 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the 
US presidential election, which possibly foreshadowed 
a broader shift toward unilateralism.2 At the same time, 
countries have been moving to lower corporate tax rates 
(for example, France and the United States) and to adopt 
or propose special taxes aimed at the digital economy 
(for example, the European Union and India), raising the 
prospect of increased tax competition. This edition of the 
Bulletin for International Taxation includes many of the 
papers presented at the conference and commentary by 
discussants. 
3.  Preliminary Observations
What may we draw from the conference and these papers? 
The disruptive forces affecting taxation in developed 
economies are globalization, information technology 
and digital commerce, and mobility of certain labour 
segments. These factors have allowed economic activity 
to be mobile and capable of fragmentation, businesses to 
2. These non-tax events are examples in two countries. In other coun-
tries as well, events and elections have manifested a rise in populism 
and nationalism. What effect these will have for international cooper-
ation in non-tax arenas remains to be seen. In addition to this political 
context, taxation is challenged by pressures from advances in infor-
mation technology, globalization of business, and increased mobil-
ity of capital, high-skilled labor and economic migration, which are 
sources of pressure for unilateral instead of or in addition to coordi-
nated responses. See T. Dagan, International Tax Policy (Cambridge 
2017). The intersection of these developments heightens the difficul-
ties to resolve the taxation issues. 
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become decentred, and countries to be cherry-picked for 
their most advantageous attributes.3 This has led coun-
tries, from the largest and richest to the smallest and least 
developed, in turn to engage in tax competition with pos-
itive and negative outcomes. 
The BEPS Project represents a sustained effort at tax coop-
eration and coordination to restrict tax avoidance and to 
stem loss of public confidence in tax systems and revenue 
losses for governments. The post-BEPS development of 
the Inclusive Framework established a broad multilateral 
governance forum that conferred a degree of ex post legit-
imacy on the BEPS Project and provided a structure for 
engaging in non-enforceable peer reviews of BEPS man-
dates, standards and best practices. Less successful has 
been the effort to mobilize transfer pricing standards and 
enforcement to mitigate BEPS and competition;4 however, 
CbCR is affecting multinationals’ behaviour. The effect 
and legitimacy of the MLI and the ability of mutual 
agreement procedures (MAP) and mandatory arbitra-
tion dispute resolution procedures to handle the expected 
increase in taxation disputes is uncertain. Those mech-
anisms are still in the midst of deployment and imple-
mentation, and their outcomes are only preliminarily dis-
cernible. In summary, the BEPS Project has had major 
successes in achieving consensus with respect to its artic-
ulated positions and objectives, and in achieving a frame-
work for moving forward on those, but the long-term sub-
stantive outcomes remain unclear.
When we turn to the unfinished business of BEPS for 
developed countries, the starting point is a substan-
tial withdrawal from residence-based taxation of direct 
investment under the pressure of tax competition for 
mobile activity and real investment. To date, proposed 
structural responses in relation to strengthening and 
extending source taxation have not surmounted design 
problems and political objections, and tax rate compe-
tition continues. Pending a new source taxation-based 
equilibrium, political pressures are giving rise in Europe 
and other regions to new modes of taxation designed for 
the digital economy that do not integrate into existing 
taxing regimes and are acknowledged to be stopgap mea-
sures until more robust structural measures can be found.
In relation to developing countries, we confront the dis-
ruptive force of extreme inequality, first, within some 
nations and, more dramatically, between rich and poor 
countries and rich and poor globally. What is the role of 
taxation? One response among others is revenue mobi-
lization – to expand and defend the existing tax base in 
developing countries. Post-BEPS measures considered 
in conference presentations included taxation of loca-
tion-specific rents realized directly and in offshore indi-
rect asset transfers, and improving transfer pricing. These 
issues are in early stages of sustained attention and require 
considerable further work. 
3. See R. Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the 
New Globalization (Harvard 2016).
4. See J. Andrus & P. Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are 
We and Where Should We Be Going, 95 Taxes Magazine 89 (2017).
The international tax regime is at a way station in coping 
with the disruptive forces of change. While evolution in 
taxation is a constant process, it is clear that economic 
forces have undergone unusually rapid change and the 
traditional lag in tax system response is unsatisfactory at 
a political level. The pressure for more stable solutions is 
unlikely to abate.
We turn to review the articles in this issue and their con-
tributions to our consideration of these issues.
4.  The Topology of International Taxation after 
BEPS
4.1.  BEPS and the limits of cooperation
Susan Morse’s article focuses on the BEPS theme of taxing 
income where value is created through a consideration of 
what process is employed to make the standard of “value 
creation” operational.5 Professor Morse recognizes the 
political nature of the ambiguity in the value creation 
principle – is it a transfer pricing principle or is it a real-
location of inter-nation taxing rights? Morse examines 
how the processes engaged in answering this question will 
inf luence the resolution of its meaning. Morse identifies 
three “desirable elements” as criteria by which to evaluate 
processes for development of the meaning of value cre-
ation, “access to process, decisions on specific facts and 
disclosure of results.”6 Morse evaluates (i) ongoing OECD 
work, (ii) unilateral national legislation, and (iii) mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP) dispute resolution in rela-
tion to these three criteria and in turn how each of these 
processes is likely to inf luence the meaning of value cre-
ation. 
Johanna Hey’s commentary identifies two roles for the 
value creation principle: to identify aggressive tax avoid-
ance and as a “principle for justification and division of 
taxing rights.”7 Professor Hey examines these purposes 
and the potential for the value creation principle to fix the 
arm’s length standard. She finds the value creation princi-
ple wanting on all fronts. Hey then asks whether the Morse 
idea of a forum would allow negotiation of its meaning 
with greater certainty of result. Since value creation does 
not provide guidance on how to allocate integration and 
synergies, Hey observes there must be uncertainties in any 
outcome.8 We share Hey’s view that more scholarly work is 
needed with respect to value creation; the Morse and Hey 
articles provide an excellent addition to this discussion.
Michelle Hanlon’s article turns to one of the mandates in 
BEPS: CbCR.9 Writing at a time when no CbCR data is 
available, Professor Hanlon provides an excellent frame-
work for future data-based work. Hanlon reached out to 
5. S.C. Morse, Value Creation: A Standard in Search of a Process, 72 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
6. Id., at sec. 3.
7. J. Hey, Taxation where Value is Created under the BEPS Action Plan, 72 
Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
8. M.A. Kane, Transfer Pricing, Integration and Synergy Intangibles: A Con-
sensus Approach to the Arm’s Length Standard, 6 World Tax J. 3, sec. 1. 
(2014), Journals IBFD.
9. M. Hanlon, Country-by-Country Reporting and the International Allo-
cation of Taxing Rights, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
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tax executives, tax consultants and former government 
officials to learn their experiences with implementing 
CbCR and their expectations. Hanlon highlights that 
CbCR information does not align with data for relat-
ed-party transfer pricing and that its collection will 
involve costs (that may decline over time). Use of the data 
may result in misinterpretation by governments, likely 
will increase disputes between governments and taxpay-
ers, and may increase uncertainty for taxpayers. On the 
benefit side are increased transparency, possible posi-
tive behavioural responses (in reduced income shifting) 
and increased revenues for governments. While future 
research will be important, Hanlon cautions that isolat-
ing the effects of CbCR from other BEPS and non-BEPS 
changes will be fraught with problems of “endogeneity and 
confounding factors.”10 
Christoph Spengel’s commentary extends Hanlon’s CbCR 
analysis to cover the EU proposal to make CbCR public.11 
Based on his research, Spengel concludes that the costs of 
public CbCR outweigh the claimed benefits. He points 
in particular to the differential treatment of companies 
subject to the rules compared with those that are not and 
the resulting competitive disadvantage. Spengel finds 
claims that publicity will increase the public control func-
tion to be questionable. Hanlon’s and Spengel’s articles 
provide a foundation for continued empirical analysis and 
whet our appetite for the results of future work.
4.2.  Unilateralism versus multilateralism
In the context of taxation, multilateralism is often roughly 
translated into coordination, and unilateralism trans-
lates into tax competition. Michael Keen observes that 
tax coordination and tax competition are not incom-
patible; indeed, one inf luences the other.12 Tax coordi-
nation, in terms of BEPS, ref lects agreement on certain 
rules of the road to mitigate profit shifting and avoidance, 
but there are many avenues for tax competition. If all are 
not addressed, such as setting tax rates, then limiting the 
scope for competition through one avenue, such as the tax 
base, may increase competition through another avenue, 
such as rates (and Keen asks whether recent US rate reduc-
tions might be such an example). 
Keen observes as well that tax instruments differ in the 
extent to which they are susceptible to tax competition. 
One of the attractive points of the DBCFT is its resistance 
to competition. Coordinating other instruments, such as 
the EU’s proposed common consolidated corporate tax 
base (CCCTB), requires agreement on more moving parts 
and is more challenging politically. 
Keen points out that the effects of tax competition may 
be muted if countries are alike, but may be dramatic for 
countries that are very different in size or in the nature of 
their economy. Even with ideal design, national attributes 
10. Id., at sec. 8.
11. C. Spengel, Country-by-Country Reporting and the International Alloca-
tion of Taxing Rights: Comments to Michelle Hanlon, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 
4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
12. M. Keen, Competition, Coordination and Avoidance in International 
Taxation, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
and national interests will affect whether tax competition 
is considered desirable; if it is, competition will continue. 
Keen’s article reminds lawyers and policymakers of the 
inexorable pressures of an economic system – closing one 
avenue increases pressures on others. In short, tax com-
petition will not go away.
Professors Christians and van Apeldoorn direct our atten-
tion to the institutional framework within which interna-
tional coordination occurs.13 They give the OECD plau-
dits for moving to the Inclusive Framework’s involvement 
“on an equal footing” of over 100 countries as an import-
ant response to legitimacy concerns. Christians and van 
Apeldoorn go on to explore the obstacles to equal partic-
ipation. These include lack of resources and capacity to 
participate on an equal basis in meetings, lack of transpar-
ency regarding the structure and work f low of the Inclu-
sive Framework, and lack of bargaining power. Christians 
and van Apeldoorn challenge the OECD, constructively, 
with 12 questions that are designed to assure “substan-
tive inclusion.” 
The MLI is a creative and ambitious multilateral instru-
ment designed to implement BEPS treaty changes more 
effectively than can be accomplished solely with bilat-
eral negotiations and implementation. Johann Hattingh 
demonstrates through an analysis of the initial BEPS sig-
natories’ coverage of bilateral treaties and their reserva-
tions that the picture is more complex.14 He finds that “the 
MLI’s impact will be predominantly felt in high-income 
countries through awarding new discretion-based legal 
rules to tax authorities to decide whether taxpayers are 
entitled to tax treaty benefits.”15 In some cases, the cov-
erage and reservations disclose an objective to preserve 
or engage in tax competition. Professor Hattingh’s article 
is an enlightening early analysis of the strategic choices 
made by MLI signatories and non-signatories.
5.  The unfinished Business of BEPS
5.1.  Moving developed economies towards a 
destination basis
The retreat by most countries from residence-based tax-
ation of foreign income has increased the focus on coun-
tries’ source taxation and the possibility of destina-
tion-based taxes or sales-based apportionment of taxing 
rights. While the academic wing of the tax policy world 
has repeatedly taken interest in adoption of a cash f low 
business tax, such a large-scale change so far has not been 
adopted in larger developed economies.16 Sales-based 
apportionment has not been tried at a national level.
13. A. Christians & L. van Apeldoorn, The OECD Inclusive Framework, 72 
Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
14. J. Hattingh, The Impact of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument on Interna-
tional Tax Policies, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
15. Id., at sec. 4.
16. Prior proposals have included the Meade Committee Report (1978), 
the Bush Presidential Advisory Panel (2005), Mirrlees Review (2011) 
and House GOP “A Better Way” (2016). J.E. Meade, The Structure and 
Reform of Direct Taxation (Unwin 1978); Report of the President’s Advi-
sory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair & Pro-Growth: Pro-
posals to Fix America’s Tax System (Nov. 2005), available at https:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-
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Daniel Shaviro’s article deconstructs the most recent US 
offering of a DBCFT and explains why the transition from 
an origin-based income tax, with its transfer pricing vul-
nerabilities, to a DBCFT, with its transition wealth gains 
and losses and disputed adjustment periods, failed polit-
ically in the United States.17 Professor Shaviro shows how 
the DBCFT as introduced in the United States was “poli-
cy-defective” on multiple levels, most of which had been 
anticipated in prior work by David Bradford. When cash 
f low taxation arises again, as it inevitably will, Shaviro’s 
article should be an early must read by policymakers. 
Ulrich Schreiber’s article is a careful and important anal-
ysis of a sales-based profit allocation under the traditional 
arm’s length accounting method.18 Professor Schreiber 
considers how to construct both a transactional and a 
group-wide residual sales-based profit split. Importantly, 
Schreiber recognizes that “attribution of profits to sales 
locations combined with a tax credit granted by sales 
jurisdictions represents a comprehensive change of the 
corporate income tax because it may alter the inter-ju-
risdictional distribution of tax revenues in favour of sales 
jurisdictions.”19 He rejects 100% allocation to the source 
country and sensibly relies on a profit split allocation 
framework. He observes that such a system requires coor-
dination as to the income division metric and the tax base. 
Once again, the focus is on reducing the scope for transfer 
pricing manipulation; a potential benefit of sales appor-
tionment is reliance on factors that are relatively immo-
bile and therefore are less likely to result in shifting real 
investment. Scott Wilkie’s commentary observes that Sch-
reiber’s proposal would function as a form of minimum 
tax.20 Wilkie extends the logic of Schreiber’s proposal of 
sales-based allocation to ask why not impose a minimum 
tax and implement it through a source withholding tax 
on payments to non-residents? The Schreiber article is 
an important contribution to the literature, and Wilkie’s 
commentary presents an intriguing alternative. 
Wolfgang Schön’s article asks the tough questions that 
should be addressed, but often are not, in respect of pro-
posals to single out the digital economy for specialized tax 
treatment.21 Hidden in plain view, however, are some pref-
erences, or possibly guidelines. There needs to be a justifi-
cation for a special instrument and, if used, its effects other 
than on revenue should be taken into account. If corpo-
rate taxation is the chosen instrument, it is an income tax 
Tax-System-2005.pdf; J. Mirrlees et al., Tax by Design p. 419 (Oxford 
2011), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5353; Majority 
Members of House Committee on Ways and Means, A Better Way: 
Our Vision for a Confident America, Tax Reform Task Force Blueprint 
(24 June 2016), available at http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/
ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf. See Ernst & Young, Experiences with 
Cash Flow Taxation and Prospects (Final Report) 55-63 (EU Tax’n Papers 
N. 55-2015) (discussing Estonia’s cash f low tax system).
17. D. Shaviro, Goodbye To All That? A Requiem For The Destination-Based 
Cash Flow Tax, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
18. U. Schreiber, Sales-Based Apportionment of Profits, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 
4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
19. Id., at sec 1.
20. J.S. Wilkie, An Inverted Image Inspires a Question: Comments on Pro-
fessor Ulrich Schreiber’s “Sales-Based Apportionment of Profits”, 72 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
21. W. Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the Digitalized 
Economy, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
imposed on a return to investment, and the investment 
should have a link to the destination. Why reinvent if it 
is possible to stay reasonably close to established interna-
tional norms and mitigate risks of double taxation or col-
lateral damage? These and more are found in this timely 
and valuable article that should be considered by policy-
makers considering special digital tax rules. 
Walter Hellerstein’s commentary on Schön recaps US 
experience with sales-based formula apportionment, 
reminding readers that there is precedent for using a des-
tination basis for allocating income.22 Yet, ultimately the 
message is a cautionary one: 
As legitimate as it may be to rely on the market as one of several 
indicators of income attribution, to rely largely or exclusively 
on the market as many US states now do through their appor-
tionment formulas is difficult if not impossible to defend as a 
matter of tax policy.23 
5.2.  Mobilizing revenue for developing countries
Miranda Stewart’s tour through the data on income and 
wealth disparity between countries and between people is 
jaw dropping in its effect.24 To some, expanding inequality 
is or will be the disruptive force affecting social, political 
and economic activity. Professor Stewart reviews the tools 
available to further redistribution, but there are obvious 
limits and constraints. International allocation of income, 
particularly to source countries, has some promise, but it 
has not been realized. It requires coordination and may 
conflict with seeking investment as a means for growth. 
Stewart describes Braithewaite’s and Drahos’ comment on 
how multinationals end-run the international tax regime: 
[T]he failures of the international tax regime compared to other 
forms of international regulation, comprising ‘polycentric, reg-
ulatory diversity’ between ‘rogue fiscal sovereigns,’ constantly 
out-played by the ‘monocentric complexity’ of multinational 
enterprises operating globally.25 
Stewart suggests considering transnational institutions 
of taxation and redistribution. She looks to “deterrito-
rialized” multinationals as a potential resource, but this 
(again) would require coordination.
Itai Grinberg’s commentary agrees with Stewart’s objec-
tives but points to practical limits on inter-nation redis-
tribution not otherwise motivated by enlightened self-in-
terest.26 Professor Grinberg points to the successes of 
globalization in fostering poverty alleviation and credits 
multinational investment with an important role in this 
success.27 He also questions reliance on the corporate tax-
ation with its inefficiencies as a tool for redistribution. 
Instead, he encourages developing countries to tax the 
22. W. Hellerstein, A US Subnational Perspective on the “Logic” of Taxing 
Income on a “Market” Basis, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals 
IBFD.
23. Id., at sec. 2.
24. M. Stewart, Redistribution between Rich and Poor Countries, 72 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
25. Id., at sec 5.2., quoting J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos International Business 
Regulation (2000).
26. I. Grinberg, Comment on Miranda Stewart’s “Redistribution between 
Rich and Poor Countries”, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
27. Id., at sec. 2.2.
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capital income of their residents, relying on information 
f lows enhanced by FATCA-like measures, as a visible 
commitment to revenue mobilization, and reliance on a 
broader base and administration and enforcement capac-
ity building, including in implementing the VAT and 
resource taxation, as additional measures.28 
Patricia Hofmann and Nadine Riedel review the chal-
lenges developing countries face in applying arm’s length 
transfer pricing.29 They observe that the limited empiri-
cal literature suggests that developing countries are more 
at risk to income shifting, but this clearly is an area that 
should receive more study. The problems facing develop-
ing countries include capacity limitations, scarce infor-
mation on comparable transactions and the increas-
ing complexity of evolving rules. They review possible 
responses and make a case for use of safe harbours and 
formula-based allocations in exchange for diminished 
compliance and administration costs. 
Richard Collier’s commentary reviews the history in 
recent years of OECD engagement with developing 
countries and notes the displacement effect of the BEPS 
Project on that work.30 He also describes the explosion 
in complexity of transfer pricing analysis required under 
28. Id., at sec. 3. 
29. P. Hofmann & N. Riedel, Transfer Pricing Regimes for Developing Coun-
tries, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
30. R.S. Collier, The Impact of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing Project on the Task for Developing Countries of Applying the Arm’s 
Length Principle in Practice, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals 
IBFD.
the BEPS prescriptions. While there has been substan-
tial effort since the advent of the Inclusive Framework 
to address capacity issues and provide technical support, 
core difficulties remain. 
Mitchell Kane provides a review and careful analysis of 
what have loosely been called indirect transfers.31 Profes-
sor Kane identifies the reasons a source country might 
want to tax offshore indirect transfers, including the pos-
sibility of taxing rents that otherwise could go untaxed. 
Kane’s article will be welcome by policymakers consid-
ering this taxation approach, and is a contribution to the 
literature. 
6.  Two Days in Munich
All of the preceding and more was discussed in two 
days, but every problem was not solved. The articles in 
this edition of the Bulletin for International Taxation evi-
dence the richness of international tax issues that remain 
for young tax scholars and professionals to deal with for a 
long time to come. We expect these issues to be “resolved” 
in the way that tax issues are: with imperfect, pragmatic 
responses. These in turn will bring responses and a need 
for further evolution of the international tax regime.
We are pleased to have been associated with this project 
and are confident that the articles in this issue will con-
tinue to inform readers well into the future.
31. M.A. Kane, Offshore Transfers: Policies and Divergent Views, 72 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018), Journals IBFD.
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